Do Not Carry Expired Pepper Spray

Pepper spray can be an excellent self defense tool and most people can easily learn how to use it effectively. However, a pepper spray canister does not last forever. Although the pepper ingredient (oleoresin capsicum or OC) does not lose its effectiveness (ask me how I know)—the propellant can and does lose its ability to spray properly over time.

You might have been wondering about the picture of piggies. Last year we had some wild pig visitations and they apparently found the grubs in my front yard particularly appealing. If you have never had piggies paying attention to your lawn, they can and will destroy it and can do so in a remarkably short period of time. A lawn that piggies have attacked looks like a drunken farmer plowed it in the dark.

As I was attempting to devise a way to discourage their interest, I decided to spray OC from expired pepper spray canisters on the yard. Spoiler alert: OC did not appear to bother piggies in the slightest, so this is not a way to discourage their interest in a lawn. During this process, all the expired pepper spray canisters did expel their contents in some manner; however, some simply dribbled the contents on my hand rather than spraying. There was no external indication showing which expired canister would spray and which was going to dribble.  I did notice that the smaller canisters tended to dribble more than the larger ones. This is perhaps due to the lower percentage of propellant in the smaller canisters.

Most pepper spray canisters have either a manufacturer date or an expiration date stamped on them somewhere for a reason. The standard expiration is five years from date of manufacture or on the noted date. The picture on right is a canister that was manufactured on April 10, 2016 and expired on April 10, 2021. You should not use expired pepper spray canisters because they may dribble the contents all over your hand or fail to spray at all. 

Replace expired pepper spray canisters and properly dispose of the expired canisters. This may mean throwing away canisters that are not empty, but this is a small cost in the broader scheme of things. Since the ability to maintain distance is a key advantage of pepper spray, do not rely on expired canisters for protection—you may get a dribble instead of a spray which will compound rather than solve your problem.

The “Old” Bakersfield Police Department Qualification

There are numerous discussions of the “Old” Bakersfield Police Department Qualification floating around on the internet. I believe I first encountered a description when I read Andy Stanford’s article “R.I.P. Mike Waidelich Requiem for an Unsung Hero” that discussed Mike Waidelich and the concept behind his development of the qualification (see note below for additional information).

According to Stanford’s article, in 1967 the Bakersfield Police Chief appointed Mike Waidelich as the department firearms rangemaster with specific instructions to improve the department’s firearms training program -- he served in this position for twelve years. Waidelich developed the ten round Bakersfield handgun qualification during that time.

The “Old” Bakersfield Police Department Qualification is as follows:

    -- Two rounds in 1.5 seconds at 10 feet

    -- Two rounds in 2.0 seconds at 20 feet

    -- Two reload Two in 6.0 seconds (8.0 for revolvers) at 30 feet

    -- Two rounds in 3.5 seconds at 60 feet

I use the term “old” because I see several internet sources discussing what they purport to be the “new” Bakersfield Police Department Qualification. I doubt that this is accurate since from my research, the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) requires a minimum of thirty-six rounds to be fired at five, seven, and fifteen yards with the handgun (LD 35 of the PC 832 Arrest and Firearms Training Specifications). I can find no official document concerning the current Bakersfield Police Department Qualification course of fire. I would appreciate any official references that provide this information.

Per Stanford’s article, the old qualification scoring was shot on a silhouette target with a 7-inch circular ten-point scoring zone, with the next scoring zone measuring 9×13 inches earning nine points, and finally hits anywhere else on the silhouette scoring six points.

Additionally, the scoring method provided for time penalties of one point per quarter second (0.25 sec) over the time allowed for the string. So, if you fired two shots in 1.5 seconds at 10 feet, you received zero penalties; however, at 1.75 seconds you lost 1 point, at 2.0 seconds you lost 2 points, etc. This was before the widespread availability of electronic timers and the rangemaster likely used an analog stopwatch for recording the time to the quarter of a second. As one might expect, the timer’s reaction time introduced some variance to the measurement.

Paraphrasing Stanford’s article, Bakersfield Officers had to earn a minimum of 80-points out of a possible 100 on either string out of two tries to pass the qualification. If a shooter failed to shoot an 80 in his first two attempts, he was sent to a side range to dry practice and then given a third try. Failure on the third try resulted in additional training requirements and possible sanction.

I run a monthly Short Range self-defense match where most stages are based upon a real-life event that was recorded on video and that I adapted for a square range. For the past year, I have used several versions of a standards stage that allows competitors to measure improvements in their performance. For the September 2024 match, I decided to run the old Bakersfield Police Department Qualification. Competitors shooting the match once, completed two iterations of the qualification while competitors shooting the match twice completed four iterations, etc.

We used my standard qualification targets with a ten-point scoring zone measuring 6 x 11 inches giving the shooters a total ten-point area of sixty-six square inches. This is a forty-two percent larger and therefore more generous ten-point area than the old Bakersfield 7-inch circular ten-point scoring zone (of 38.38 square inches); however, for the Short Range Match, any hits outside this ten-point area only earned three points. The target was covered with a t-shirt, so the scoring area was not visible to the shooter. (See photo on the right.)

Of the thirty pistol competitors who participated in the match, thirteen qualified and seventeen failed to qualify. We used the Bakersfield time deductions so a competitor shooting the ten-yard string at 1.51 seconds lost one point, at 1.76 seconds the shooter lost two points, for 2.01 seconds they lost three points, etc. I deducted 0.50 seconds off a shooter’s time when they started with a concealed draw. This scoring method imposed a much greater accuracy standard on the shooter and several shooters failed to qualify by only one point.

My first stage in the match happened to be the standards stage so I shot the Bakersfield qualification cold for my first run unconcealed with the following result:

Name:	Eric Lamberson	Date:	8-Sep-24
		Time	Overtime Points
10 Feet	2rds	2.12	3
20 Feet	2rds	2.41	2
30 Feet	2 Reload 2	6.00	0
60 Feet	2rds	2.67	0
Time Deduction			-5 points
Target Points: 93
Total Points: 88

I used my SIG P-320 Compact Carry pistol (my EDC pistol) for the match.  This was the first time I had fired this pistol in over seven months since I have been concentrating on improving my Steel Challenge shooting performance using my full-size P-320 X5.

I was pleased with my initial run. I had nine hits in the ten-point scoring zone and one hit in the three-point scoring zone for a total of ninety-three points. My 2.12 second overtime on string #1 cost me three points and my 2.41 second time on string two cost me two additional points for a total deduction of five points. My score was 88 so I passed the qualification. I shot the match twice, so I had four runs total. For my second run I earned an 87, for the third and fourth runs I shot a 99 on each.

One other IDPA Master shot the match and he scored an 80, 89, 90, and 86 respectively on his four runs. Several competitors that qualified only passed one run out of two. Other competitors who failed to pass shot very quickly; however, their accuracy was subpar while some earned the points on the target but lost too many points through time penalties.

Feedback from the competitors who shot the match was positive so I will probably run it again in the future.

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Notes:

You can find Stanford's article reprinted on a couple of internet websites; however, I have not found the original article. The link to Andy Stanford's article downloads a .pdf file:

https://www.facebook.com/JamesYeagerofTacticalResponse/posts/rip-mike-waidelichrequiem-for-an-unsung-hero-by-andy-stanfordlyle-wyatt-just-cal/3851889504887819/

Bob Jewell wrote a well-researched article in the July 2024 edition of USCCA’s Concealed Carry Magazine which provides additional information and some pictures of Mike Waidelich.  The link to Bob Jewell’s USCCA article downloads a .pdf file:

https://www.firearmtrainerpodcast.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/USCCA-July-2024-Waidelich.pdf

The Sensible Self Defense Academy Short Range Match

We run a monthly Short Range self-defense match where most stages are based upon a real-life event that was recorded on video and that I adapted for a square range. Typically, armed robberies, home invasions, with an occasion terrorist-themed stage.

Threat targets either have a mask or show a visible weapon and are covered so the shooter must aim at an anatomically correct scoring area (upper chest) to achieve proper hits. We cover non-threats as well. The difference is the non-threat will show no visible weapon. It is surprising how tempting some of the non-threats can be when you are in the middle of a stage.

I can always tell when I have new shooters in the match because there will be hits below the down-zero scoring area. New shooters often aim for what they imagine is the “center of mass.” People who shoot the match regularly, know better and aim for the upper chest.

The picture of the uncovered target below illustrates this. This target was for the Standards Stage and has an anatomically correct scoring area. We replace the down zero scoring area after every shooter. If you look at the back of the target, you can see that during the match, most of the shooters achieved down-zero hits.  Ten shooters engaged that target during the match, firing 200 rounds.

When I send out the match results, I include a link to the video of the events from that match. The idea is for the shooter to solve the problem and then view the video of the actual event to understand how it happened in real-life.

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School Active Shooters -- A Research Summary

In March 2024, I attended Ed Monk’s Active Shooter Instructor class at Karl Rehn’s KR Training facility. This class provided a foundation for researching school shootings as I was preparing to train school guardians from a Texas independent school district. A summary of my research follows.

Schools and school grounds can be surprisingly violent places. I researched almost 600 shooting incidents at schools from the years 2000 – 2024 and selected forty-eight active shooter* incidents to research. I excluded one-on-one shootings, fights, gang shootings, targeted shootings involving adults, drive-by shootings, and similar incidents. Although active shooter incidents have occurred at colleges and universities, for this research I only included elementary, middle, and high school incidents where the shooter clearly intended to shoot multiple people.

Weapons

In the forty-eight incidents, the weapons that shooters used were as follows:

    -- Rifle and Pistol: Five incidents
    -- Rifle Only: Eight incidents
    -- Shotgun and Pistol: Four incidents
    -- Shotgun Only: Eight incidents
    -- Pistol Only: Twenty-Three incidents

In total, shooters used  long guns only in sixteen incidents and  pistols only in twenty-three incidents. In nine incidents shooters were armed with long guns and pistols. Most younger shooters obtained their firearms from the family home, often without an adult family member’s knowledge. Some late teen and older shooters obtained weapons when they killed family members. For example, 16-year-old Jeff Weise killed his grandfather (a police sergeant) and his grandfather's girlfriend at their home. After taking his grandfather's police weapons and bulletproof vest, Weise drove his grandfather's police vehicle to Red Lake Senior High School, where he had been a student some months before. At the school, Weise shot and killed seven people and wounded at least nine others.

Patterns Associated with School Type

Some patterns emerged in this research. Elementary school shooters tended to not be associated with the school and none were students at the schools they attacked. In several incidents elementary school students brought pistols to school; however, none apparently intended to shoot multiple people. Conversely, shooters attacking middle and high schools often were students at the schools they attacked.

Elementary School Shootings

There were seven active shooter incidents during this time frame at elementary schools. All these incidents started outside the school, or the perpetrator was not currently associated with the school—none were current students. Three shooters entered the school through unlocked doors, while two shooters shot through locked glass doors to gain entry. Two shooters attacked students and their teachers on playgrounds.

The average age of the elementary school shooters was twenty-five years old with the youngest being fourteen and the oldest forty-one. Police stopped two shooters during gunfights. During the shootings that started on the playground, nearby bystanders disarmed both of the shooters, one while he was reloading his pistol and another when his pistol jammed. Finally, three shooters stopped themselves, two committed suicide and one surrendered to a school front office worker.

Middle School Shootings

There were fourteen active shooter incidents during this time frame at middle schools. Only one of these incidents occurred outside the school. Three shooters entered the targeted school through unlocked doors and immediately began firing. Ten incidents started in the school after the shooter smuggled a firearm inside—seven started in the hallway and three started in classrooms. Finally, two shooters began in a gymnasium and one in the cafeteria.

The average age of the middle school shooters was fourteen with the youngest being twelve and the oldest twenty-five years old. Teachers disarmed four shooters and one shooter’s parents disarmed him after they realized two firearms were missing from the home. They rushed to the school and intervened in time to stop their son. Five shooters stopped themselves when they committed suicide and three surrendered. One shooter fled the scene and police later arrested him.

High School Shootings

There were twenty-seven active shooter incidents during this time frame at high schools. Two of these incidents occurred outside the school. Two shooters entered the targeted school through unlocked doors and immediately began firing. Twenty-three incidents started in the school after the shooter smuggled a firearm inside—thirteen started in the hallway and six started in the cafeteria. Three shooters began in classrooms and two began in the school’s main office area. Finally, one shooter fired into the school from a parking lot after he drove past a security booth, one shooter started in a courtyard, and in one incident, two shooters simultaneously started in different locations.

The average age of the high school shooters was sixteen with the youngest being fourteen and the oldest twenty-one years old. Eleven shooters were disarmed: teachers disarmed six shooters, janitors disarmed two, students disarmed one shooter, a police officer and school resource officer (SRO) disarmed one shooter, and a security guard disarmed one. Two shooters died during the incident in gunfights with police or an SRO. Seven shooters stopped themselves when they committed suicide. Five shooters fled the scene; police later arrested four and one committed suicide as police approached. Three shooters simply stopped and surrendered.

Stopping the Shooter

School campuses are often very large and encompass multiple buildings and other facilities. Of the forty-eight incidents, police or SROs only stopped five. Police or SROs cannot be everywhere simultaneously and the chance that one will be immediately available when an incident begins is coincidence at best. In general, unless an SRO or police officer is present at the school, responding officers will not arrive in time to quickly stop the killing (Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School and Robb Elementary School being the obvious exceptions where officers could have potentially stopped the shooter earlier in the incident).

Of the eighteen shooters who were disarmed during the incident, teachers or school staff disarmed thirteen. Bystanders disarmed two, students disarmed one, a police officer disarmed one, and a security guard disarmed one.

Twenty-seven shooters stopped themselves.  Fourteen shooters committed suicide during the incident—only one did so as police arrived. Seven shooters surrendered during the incident and six shooters fled the scene.

The conclusion of multiple researchers is that the longer an active shooter has unopposed/unchallenged access to victims, the higher the injury and death toll will be.**  The conclusion is obvious; the faster the killer is stopped, the sooner the killing will stop.

In my opinion (and that of many other trainers), the competent armed private citizen who is is physically and mentally prepared to act decisively is the only way to effectively oppose/challenge an active shooter in a school or other public location and quickly stop the killing.

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* The Federal Government defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.” In addition to the term “active shooter,” several other terms to describe someone committing these atrocities are in use in the United States including mass murderer, active killer, mass shooter, active mass murderer, and probably others. Many within the firearms community decry the use of “active shooter” because a first responder deploying a firearm is in fact an active shooter as well. Ed Monk stated that he uses the term “active shooter” because that term is the one most used in the United States so I used it here as well.

** Two researchers in particular stand out. As I mentioned above, LTC (Ret) Ed Monk has probably done as much research into the active shooter incidents as anyone and his lecture and class are worth attending if you have the opportunity. Tim Larkin posted six videos on Ed’s class and did an interview with Ed as well. They are worth a look: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDDK0jLsdKQ

Another is retired police officer Ron Borsch. His material is more challenging to find on the internet, but worth the effort.

Do Not Aim at the Chest?

I often read articles on one of the major concealed carry insurance websites that generally has very good material. My guess would be that this website also has many users who are new to shooting and concealed carry. The quantity of utter nonsense you read on the internet concerning firearms and self-defense is staggering and it is rarely worth the effort to comment. However, I recently saw an article on this website that has several egregious statements that I simply cannot let pass without saying something--my observations are in parentheses as follows:

    -- Article: In my (the author's) opinion, the best option for close-range self-defense shooting is a five or six-shot center-fire revolver. (Comment: Of course everyone is entitled to their opinion; however, a mechanically sound semi-auto pistol is a pretty good choice for close-range encounters.)

    -- Article: . . . and with no manual safety to fumble, revolvers are less prone to malfunction. (Comment: Lack of training on properly disengaging the safety may be an issue; however, I have never seen safeties causing pistols to malfunction. Further, many striker-fired pistols have no manual safety . . . so)

    -- Article: Furthermore, a snub revolver can be fired from nearly any position without malfunction, including from the ground. (Comment: In reality, a revolver can probably be fired from any position if you can maintain a firing grip and work the trigger. So can a semi-auto pistol. I have fired and seen others fire semi-auto pistols from every conceivable position without issue.)

The article recommends adding some type of laser sighting system to the revolver. (Comment: I am a big fan of lasers for low light scenarios and have one on my primary carry pistol; however, in bright sunshine, lasers are almost impossible to acquire quickly because the sun washes out the laser's dot making it very difficult to see.)

The article then discusses a drill for improving your accuracy. Using three targets ten feet or closer. The strings described for the drill are generally reasonable; however, two recommendations are way into “did he actually say that?” territory.

    -- Article: Practice acquiring your target using the laser dot to maintain sharp focus on the threat. (Comment: See comment above concerning laser sighting systems in bright sunshine. Further, I do not know how a laser would encourage you “to maintain sharp focus on the threat.”)

    -- Article: Aim for the “X” ring of a B27 type silhouette target, not the chest, to improve accuracy. (Comment: Aiming at a specific point does not improve accuracy. Also, since the article purports to be about self-defense, recommending that the shooter not aim for the chest is simply bad advice. I doubt that many humans threatening or using unlawful deadly force have “X-rings” conveniently located anywhere on their body. All of them have a chest however and aiming for the chest at least gets you closer to an area of rapid incapacitation.)

My thoughts.

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Tactical Anatomy's Shooting With X-Ray Vision

I recently attended Dr James William’s Shooting With XRay Vision (SXRV) instructor’s course at Meade Hall Range in Oklahoma. I had desired to attend this class for some time and was pleased with the opportunity.

Dr Williams originally developed the SXRV curriculum to teach peace officers how to quickly end gunfights. With the proliferation of private citizens legally carrying firearms, the course is now open to them as well.

Of course, the only justification for shooting another human is the overwhelming need to immediately stop that person’s threat or use of unlawful deadly force. The SXRV goal is to teach students the location of vital zones where a bullet strike will likely lead to rapid incapacitation. The SXRV curriculum uses anatomic drawings, x-rays, and photographs to show these zones of incapacitation and the anatomy of vital structures within these zones.

The instructor then translates these two-dimensional drawings into a 3-D model by drawing the anatomy onto a live human assistant wearing a tight, white t-shirt. Demonstrating the relationship between a 2-D flat drawing and a 3-D model helps students understand the location of these vital structures – something that is difficult to do with 2-D targets.  This exercise helps the students visualize the locations of these vital structures from a 360-degree perspective.

The class then uses laser-enabled dummy guns such as the Next Level Training SIRT pistol to target and illuminate the locations of these vital structures on the model. Doc Williams makes corrections as necessary during this exercise. We finished the classroom portion with an exercise on an electronic simulator where the students were challenged to make anatomically correct hits during deadly force scenarios such as armed robberies, kidnappings, etc.

The class live fire exercise uses 3-D plastic targets also covered with tight, white t-shirts. Students place anatomically correct hits on the 3-D targets, while rotating the targets through 360 degrees between strings of fire. Once again, Doc made necessary corrections.

I have been using 2-D anatomical targets for several years in my classes and matches. Typically, I cover the targets with t-shirts so the shooter must decide where to shoot without having a typical reference aiming point. These work well for targets squarely facing or at a slight angle to the shooter; however, they do not work well for targets at more severe angles. The 3-D targets we used in the class are the Action Target 3-D targets. These targets are expensive and not ideal. They offer no means to easily score multiple hits beyond putting an intact t-shirt on the target; however, they appear to be the only 3-D targets available as of this writing.

I am a firm believer in Dr William’s Shooting With XRay Vision concept and plan to teach it as a stand-alone class and incorporate SXRV principles in my other classes where possible.

Mindset: The Cooper Color Codes Revisited

Dominick Maldonado, Pierce 

County (WA) Sheriff's Department.

“When I changed into another position, I see just the most surreal sight,” McKown said from his bed at Tacoma General Hospital "It's a young Arabic-looking boy . . . with a ball cap on and an AK in his hand. McKown drew his 9mm pistol but then had second thoughts of shooting "a kid."

McKown told Dominick Maldonado (the shooter), "I think you need to put that gun down, young man."(1)

The “kid” turned and shot McKown five times, once in the leg and four times in the torso. Per McKown: "Every one of his shots got some part of me."

Cooper’s Color Code

The Cooper Color Code as Jeff Cooper promulgated it was not a system for describing levels of potential danger or situational awareness, but rather a technique to enable a law-abiding citizen (i.e. someone in McKown’s circumstance) to overcome a natural reluctance to use lawful deadly force against another.

Quoting Jeff Cooper: “The color code is not a means of assessing danger or formulating a tactical solution. It is rather a psychological means of overcoming your innate reluctance to shoot a man down. Normal people have a natural and healthy mental block against delivering the irrevocable blow. This is good, but in a gunfight it may well get you killed. The color code enables you to change your state of mind by three steps, each of which enables you to overcome your mental block and take lifesaving action.” (2)

Cooper’s color code conditions are White, Yellow, Orange, and Red as follows:

-- Condition White: Completely unprepared mentally to take a human life. In Condition White you may be in deadly danger and not realize it. If you are attacked in Condition White you are unlikely to be able to effectively respond and you may be seriously injured or killed.

-- Condition Yellow: State of relaxed alertness. In Condition Yellow although you are not aware of any specific situation which may call for immediate action, you know that you may have to defend yourself today. You understand that the world is full of hazards, many of which are human, and that your readiness to take defensive action can mitigate these threats. If you are attacked in Condition Yellow you will probably prevail if you are armed and may be able to take effective action even if unarmed.

-- Condition Orange: In Condition Orange you become alert to the possibility of a deadly threat in your immediate environment. In Condition Orange you understand that you may have to shoot a specific threat, right now, today. Your normal reluctance becomes easier to overcome because your training tells you that someone is threatening to use unlawful deadly force against you or another innocent.

Although you remain cognizant of the legal and moral aspects of the situation, the actions of that threat—right there—dictate your next move.

-- Condition Red: In Condition Red you have decided to act the instant the threat’s behavior warrants an immediate response. You have drawn your pistol because you are justified in taking the threat at gunpoint (and therefore justified in immediately using lawful deadly force); you can articulate why this is so. You wait for a trigger or immediately take lifesaving actions as the totality of the circumstances dictate.

An addition to the Cooper Color Code:

-- Condition Black: The color code as many instructors currently teach: The threat has tripped a final trigger. You must immediately use lawful deadly force to defend yourself or another innocent.

Massad Ayoob teaches that Condition Red delineates the gunpoint situation where you have clearly identified a threat (I am ready to shoot this person) but the threat is not using unlawful deadly force at that instant (I am not going to shoot this person yet). Ayoob defines Black as the instant an unlawful assault using deadly force is in progress upon you or other innocent people. In other words, a trigger or decision point at which we have no alternative but to use lawful deadly force to neutralize the threat. In this view, Black, describes the various triggering events that cause you go from readiness (Condition Red) to action.

Cooper contended that “Condition Black” was unnecessary and that Condition Red sufficed because in his view you have decided you are ready to use lawful deadly force when you enter Condition Red and as a result, there is no need to go beyond that condition. 

As stated above, many who teach Condition Black contend that there is a difference between being ready to act and deciding to act; that being in a Condition Red state of mental readiness does not necessarily imply immediate action.

Cooper himself alluded to this fact: “In Condition Red, you are ready to fight. You may not actually have to act on that, but your body and mind are now prepared for physical conflict. While this does not mean you instantly attack someone, you are certainly ready and waiting for a specific trigger or predetermined action that will launch the process. This state is where you have decided that you are ready and willing to fight back. Most people quite properly find this a difficult step, but the difficulty may be eased if it is anticipated. Thus, you cannot shift any farther upscale than Red, because in Red you have already surmounted the barrier. Adding categories merely complicates the problem without achieving any useful objective.” (3)

So, is Condition Black necessary? I guess it depends on how you view the problem. If the color code “conditions” describe a state of readiness then Condition Black is not necessary as Cooper contends. Once a critical trigger is tripped moving you to Condition Red, you are no longer in a state of readiness, but rather a state of action—you are actively responding to a deadly threat. If you accept this view, Black may be a decision point; however, it is not a condition.

Do you need another psychological condition to help you pull the trigger? Jeff Cooper would have said no, and I tend to agree. (4) I don’t think we need Black as a readiness condition; however, describing Black as a decision or trigger point may be useful after the event to enable you to articulate your mindset during the incident and how/why you knew you were facing unlawful deadly force.

Dan McKown was unable to shoot someone that looked to his eyes like a kid (see opening picture) even though that kid was actively shooting people in a crowded mall. McKown was in Condition White and his reluctance could easily have cost him his life and did likely cost him a lifetime of pain.

McKown's hesitancy had nothing to do with situational awareness, he was fully aware that he faced an immediate deadly threat. The tactically sound action at that moment would have been to immediately shoot Maldonado; however, he had not resolved in his own mind what he was and was not capable of doing. I am not criticizing McKown’s choice; however, if he had not been armed, McKown likely would not have confronted Maldonado.

I have been a Texas License to Carry (LTC) instructor for over eleven years and have taught over 1500 LTC students. Prior to COVID when I was doing in-person classes, I always asked every student why they wanted to get an LTC and whether they planned to carry a pistol. “I don’t want to shoot someone; I just want to be able to scare them if I am threatened” or “I only plan to carry my pistol when I think I might need it” were common answers. I believe that these students were in Condition White.

In classes, I have always stressed that the time to make such decisions is before, not during an incident. If you are not capable of using lawful deadly force, then all the training you may have completed and the fact that you possess a pistol is irrelevant.

 

(1) Tacoma News Tribune, https://www.thenewstribune.com

(2) Jeff Cooper's Commentaries Volume Six, No 9, pg 45-46

(3) Jeff Cooper's Commentaries Volume Eleven, No 12, pg 56

(4) Jeff Cooper's Commentaries Volume Thirteen, No 1, pg 4: “Moving from the various Conditions into each other is easy to accomplish once it is understood. If you are attacked in White you will lose the fight. In Yellow you will have the advantage of initiative response over your antagonist. In Orange you are pretty safe, provided you are armed, alert and aware. In Red you win. Simple, isn't it? Clearly you cannot go any further than Red because in Red you have already made the lethal decision. Complications are unproductive.”

Tunnel Vision, Tunnel Hearing, and Stress

Sometimes during a dangerous or life-threatening situation it simply becomes impossible for you to attend to all the stimuli coming at you simultaneously. A temporary blindness or deafness effect can take place as a result. A variety of factors that include high levels of adrenaline in the body from stress or anger cause inattentional blindness--a temporary loss of peripheral vision, also referred to as temporary tunnel vision. Inattentional blindness is a psychological lack of visual perception that is not associated with any vision defects or deficits. Inattentional deafness is a similar phenomenon that affects hearing and is not associated with any hearing defects or deficits.

Everyone’s reaction to a life-threatening situation will be somewhat unpredictable. Although many accounts of traumatic incidents have similarities, no two are the same. People working in the military, police, fire, or medical fields have experienced numerous sensory distortions including tunnel vision while under stress. If you are not aware that you could experience the world in such a bizarre way, it could add to your stress levels.

“I told the SWAT team that the suspect was firing at me from down a long dark hallway about 40 feet long. When I went back to the scene the next day, I was shocked to discover that he had actually been only about 5 feet in front of me in an open room. There was no dark hallway.” (1)

Tunnel Vision: Tunnel vision can result from the combination of a fear-induced adrenaline dump associated with a specific, dangerous threat. Because kind of danger you have to be in to experience a fear-induced adrenaline rush isn’t something we can practice in a safe training environment, it is important to study the symptoms so we can recognize them when they occur.

Researchers at Johns Hopkins University ran a series of tests on human subjects with a goal of measuring the loss of visual acuity while engaging them in activities designed to narrow attention. The experiment was designed to cause tunnel vision—and it did. However, while the subjects experienced tunneled vision, they also experienced decreased auditory attention (tunnel hearing?).

Researchers discovered that visually focusing on something intently led the audio cortex to turn down the volume as well. According to Drs. Yantis and Shomstein: "Our findings support several conclusions. First attention affects early visual and auditory sensory responses. The “push-pull” effect of switching attention between vision and hearing suggests that focusing attention on auditory input (e.g., a cellular telephone conversation) can impair the ability to detect important visual events (e.g., driving an automobile). When attention is directed to the visual system the strength of audial attention is compromised (and vice versa) leading to potentially significant behavioral impairments." In other words, a person intently focused on something visual could have diminished hearing. Conversely, a person intently listening to audible cues such as a radio or cell phone could have diminished visual performance. (2)

In this article, I focus on these sensory distortions--tunnel vision and tunnel hearing.

Look at the sequence of pictures below. In this incident, three armed individuals invade a home. As they are searching through the house, they awaken a woman who steps into a doorway. One of the home invaders (white hat & jacket) notices the woman, points his pistol at her, and begins moving toward her. She opens fire with her pistol. Surprise!



Invaders #1 & #2 immediately begin scrambling to escape through the door they kicked in to gain entry. The woman advances toward the escaping home invaders and fires another shot. As she does this, home invader #3 comes running out of a hallway to the woman’s left with his pistol pointed toward her (see movement 1). As he careens past, at one point his pistol is pointed toward her head while her pistol is simultaneously pointed at him (movement 2). Their arms collide as invader #3 continues running—deflecting both pistols—neither fire (movement 3).



Invader #3 continues running toward the back door (movement 4) while she continues advancing and shooting at invaders #1 & #2 who are firing back at her without even glancing at invader #3 (movement 5).





Based on the video, I believe the woman and invader #3 were both experiencing tunnel vision. I doubt they even noticed each other at all. She was focusing on the two invaders to her front who were also shooting at her and invader #3 was fixated on escaping (he ran through the glass door at the rear of the kitchen). The video is available here: Home Invasion

Tunnel Hearing or Audio Exclusion: Tunnel hearing is like tunnel vision. In October 2021, Mr. Prince Riley and a colleague had advertised dirt bikes for sale. Two men approached Riley at his home and indicated they were interested in purchasing the bikes and Riley invited them into his garage to view the bikes. One of the men indicated that he wished to purchase the dirt bikes and that he needed to return to his car to obtain cash. The man returned and brandishing a pistol, announced a robbery. The perpetrator moved to close the garage door when he stated his intent to kill everyone.

As Prince Riley reacted to this announcement and began drawing a concealed handgun, the perpetrator fired at Riley six times missing him with all six. Riley fired once, ending the attack. Riley later stated that he thought the attacker shot at him three times. Audio from Riley’s surveillance system made it clear that the perpetrator had fired six distinct shots. Riley had experienced auditory exclusion. (3)

So, are we are stuck with a genetic predisposition that prevents us from dealing with dangerous modern emergencies? No, because we can learn, remember, adopt and practice a plan to deal with emergencies. Look at the video at the link below. The gentleman in the black shirt with a white stripe on the shoulder is an off-duty police officer who chooses to engage a robbery team at a supermarket. The wisdom of engaging in a gunfight with numerous children in the vicinity notwithstanding, the officer does not become so fixated on the bad guys to his front that he fails to notice shots coming from behind him. In other words, he does not succumb to tunnel vision nor tunnel hearing. He immediately moves to a cover position and confronts the threat behind him in response to the unexpected sound of shots to his rear (at the 24 second mark in the video). An example of good training. Supermarket video: Supermarket

These psychological and physiological reactions to dangerous events have worked very well to ensure the survival of our species. Maintaining an intense and narrow visual focus on a cave lion spotted in the brush may have been a very good survival mechanism for the early modern human. Individuals with these traits survived encounters with wild animals and their families benefited from the increased safety in the immediate environment and more protein available in their diet. This increased their chance of passing their genes onto modern humans.

Going through any simple series of motions causes the neurons in your brain that control that movement to fire in a particular sequence. The more often you repeat a physical sequence, the more “automatic” the sequence becomes. Just thinking about making those movements stimulates both the neurons in the brain that control those movements as well as the neural pathways in the muscles that command the muscles to move. Research has shown that visualizing emergency procedures is almost as good as actually performing them.

The first step in dealing with narrowing attention is understanding that it can happen as your stress level rises and your body does an adrenaline dump in response. Being able to control your stress is one of the best ways to combat the ill-effects of the hormonal chemical dump that changes your psychological, cognitive, and physical performance. Breathing techniques are very effective if you have time. If you find you are fixating on one sound or one task, make a conscious effort to unlock your senses from it and force yourself to scan your environment. It may also help combat the effects of tunneled senses if you ask yourself: What am I missing?

Practicing reactions to emergencies increases our confidence and increased confidence lowers the stress response of our bodies when we actually face dangerous situations. Our field of vision is not as narrow as it might be otherwise and our tendency to fixate on a “fear object” diminishes. Because our brain is in a more relaxed state, it is more able to dedicate resources to creatively addressing new challenges (for example, incoming gunfire from an unexpected direction). If we practice the right thing instead of simply allowing our natural reactions to rule the situation we are better able to successfully manage our behavior.

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1 Anecdotal statement from a Law Enforcement Officer. Perceptual and Memory Distortion During Officer-Involved Shootings by Alexis Artwohl, Ph.D. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, October 2002/18  

2 Control of Attention Shifts between Vision and Audition in Human Cortex, Sarah Shomstein and Steven Yantis Journal of Neuroscience 24 November 2004, 24 (47) 10702-10706

3 Stay Ready So You Don't Have to Get Ready -- The Prince Riley Story, Concealed Carry Magazine, January 2024, Vol 21, Issue 1, pages 70-75

Ed Monk’s Active Shooter Instructor Class -- An After Class Review

I recently attended Ed Monk’s Active Shooter Instructor class at Karl Rehn’s KR Training facility. The counter Active Shooter Instructor class is a two-day course for firearm instructors structured to provide an outline for experienced firearms instructors to develop and teach citizens, law enforcement, churches, schools, and businesses an effective active shooter response program. The classroom training provided extensive coverage of trends, lessons-learned, and valuable insight into the reality of an active shooter attack.

The Federal Government defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.” In addition to the term “active shooter,” several other terms to describe someone committing these atrocities are in use in the United States including mass murderer, active killer, mass shooter, active mass murderer, and probably others. Many within the firearms community decry the use of “active shooter” because a first responder deploying a firearm is in fact an active shooter as well. Ed stated that he uses the term “active shooter” because that term is the one most used in the United States.

Time and math. While it is theoretically possible to stop an active shooter before he causes any casualties, it is statistically unlikely. The question then becomes “How many casualties are acceptable?” This number is a function of time and math. Ed’s research indicates that the typical active shooter will shoot someone every ten seconds. Therefore in 30 seconds, on average the shooter will shoot three people.

I live in the small city of Garden Ridge, TX. Occasionally the Garden Ridge Police Department hosts short, private-citizen  active shooter response classes. In an announcement for a class, the Garden Ridge PD stated that: “Once notified, law enforcement will respond as quickly as possible with an average response time of three minutes.” Few would argue that three minutes is a good response time; however, in three minutes, the average shooter will have shot eighteen people. Some active shooters shoot many more than one every ten seconds in the initial moments of the attack so the casualty numbers in three minutes could be much higher.

Ed discusses the skills, tactics, techniques, and mindset necessary to stop an active shooter. Per Ed: “The best way to save the most lives once an active shooter attack starts . . . is to stop the shooter quickly!” The most successful technique is to attack the shooter and shoot him down. Other techniques include causing him to commit suicide and/or disabling the shooter or his weapon. Ed also discusses the unfortunate fact facing those who choose to be or are forced to be unarmed: you can fight (unarmed) or watch him shoot people.

Ed provides detailed data and analysis of all varieties of active shooter incidents and locations. He then provides an overview showing how to design and manage training specifically for the different types of locations where active shooter events typically occur.

Since this was an instructor class, the range training focused on live-fire drills and scenarios that train and assess skills critical to stopping this threat. The range training discussed how to run scenarios using both 3D and photo targets and how to manage these decision-based scenarios.

Hunting an Active Shooter

 

Found Him

I have taken enough training over the years that I consider the class a success if I walk away with one or two new concepts or instructional techniques. Ed Monk’s Active Shooter Instructor class was worth the time and effort to attend—I learned a lot and walked away with a wealth of new material.

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My Friend Could Not Stop the Bleed

A close friend of mine died recently—he shot himself in the left femoral artery and bled to death. It may have been an accident or it may have been intentional, the totality of recent circumstances in his life leave me and his other friends in doubt. We will never know with certainty; however, we do know that regardless of the original intent, he did try to apply a tourniquet but was not successful.

This prompted some reflection on my part. I consulted a friend of mine (Troy M.), a retired emergency room physician and my wife (also a former ER physician) and asked that given a “worst case scenario” how fast could you bleed out from a cut femoral artery? They both stated that worse case would be 60 – 90 seconds depending upon where and how the artery was damaged.

If the worst case is that you are by yourself (as my friend was), dealing with the shock and trauma from a gunshot, and with a 60 second clock ticking, digging through boxes to find the tourniquet you need to save your life is probably not going to work.

I tend to handle firearms in only two places in my home – the master bedroom and my workroom. The master bedroom is where I don and remove my every day carry pistol and my workroom is where I dry practice, clean, and maintain firearms.

Our master bedroom doubles as our safe room, so we have a complete trauma kit with tourniquets properly staged and other medical supplies ready to treat gunshot wounds and to stop the bleed.

That was not the case in my workroom. Although I do store medical supplies in my workroom, I did not have anything properly staged and ready for immediate use. I have corrected that oversight. Rest in peace my friend.

Gunfight Anatomy: The Bruce Lua Incident

This is the first in a series of articles and accompanying videos demonstrating just how fast deadly encounters can evolve. I have heard people say, “there is no timer in a gunfight.” The statement is obviously silly – the timing of your opponent’s actions dictates how fast your reaction (your timer if you will) must be in a gunfight.

One of the challenges anyone faces in a reactive gunfight is their perception-reaction time. The time required to respond to a given stimulus varies greatly across different tasks and even within the same task under different conditions. It can range from less than 0.15 seconds to many seconds depending upon the type of stimulus, the observer’s circumstances, the environment, and the stimulus complexity.

In the discussion below, I analyze the actions of three individuals involved in a gunfight. Two were Chicago Police Officers and one was a run of the mill violent criminal actor.

The Background:

On 16 May 2021, Chicago Police began to receive 911 calls concerning shots being fired in a North Lawndale suburb of Chicago, IL. Simultaneously, the Chicago ShotSpotter system began registering gunfire (see note #1 below). Chicago police responded to the area and a bystander indicated that Bruce L. Lua might have been the shooter. The police (in a marked patrol car and on foot) followed Lua for several blocks; however, Lua did not acknowledge the officers and did not follow their instructions to stop.

Other officers arrived and encountered Lua walking down an alley toward their marked patrol SUV that was stopped in and partially blocking the alley exit facing Lua. Officers Garcia and Nakayama exited their marked SUV and ordered Lua to stop and show his hands. Lua ignored their commands to stop and continued walking toward the officers with his hands concealed in his hoodie pockets.

The Gunfight:

As Officer Garcia exited the passenger side, he drew his Glock 19 to a low ready with his right hand and continued to order Lua to stop as he approached him--Lua ignored his command and continued to walk forward. Officer Nakayama exited the SUV driver’s side and began moving to his left away from the vehicle into Lua's likely path but did not draw his pistol.

When he was within three yards of Officer Garcia, Lua began withdrawing both hands from his hoodie pockets just like the officers had commanded. Lua used his left hand to shield the fact that he had a pistol in his right hand as he fired one shot at Officer Garcia striking Garcia’s pistol and hand. Lua then turned to Officer Nakayama and fired five shots, shooting him in the right shoulder and left hip respectively with the first three rounds.

Gunfight Analysis:

Lua drew and fired his pistol at Officer Garcia in 0.60 seconds; however, Lua’s pistol was only visible to Officer Garcia for 0.52 seconds before Lua fired (see red arrow below).

The Moment Lua's Pistol Becomes Visible

Based upon a review of the body worn camera (BOC) videos and police reporting, I believe the bullet Lua fired at Officer Garcia struck the trigger guard of Officer Garcia’s Glock 19 pistol. The bullet then entered the pistol grip, damaging several rounds in the pistol’s magazine (and partially ejecting the magazine) before entering Officer Garcia’s right palm and exiting the back of his hand. 

Officer Garcia’s pistol fired when Lua’s bullet struck it and this bullet impacted the concrete at Lua’s feet (see red arrow below). In an instant, Officer Garcia’s primary pistol was rendered inoperable. If he had a backup pistol, Officer Garcia never attempted to draw it.

Officer Garcia's Pistol Fires the Moment Lua's Bullet Strikes It

Lua turned and fired his first shot at Officer Nakayama 1.28 seconds into the gunfight and within 0.68 seconds of shooting Officer Garcia striking Officer Nakayama’s right shoulder on his bullet resistant vest. Lua fired a second shot at Officer Nakayama 0.50 seconds after the first which likely missed. Lua fires a third shot 0.33 seconds later likely striking Officer Nakayama in the left hip which caused the officer to stumble backwards and ultimately fall. Lua fires fourth shot 0.25 seconds later and a final shot, both of which miss Officer Nakayama. Lua's fifth shot hits the ground. In the image below left, you can see LUA firing his first shot at Officer Nakayama in the below right, Lua is firing his third shot.  Notice, Lua continued to aggressively advance toward Officer Nakayama as this exchange of gunfire unfolded.

Officer Nakayama drew his pistol and fired his first shot one handed 1.74 seconds after Lua initiated the gunfight and 0.66 seconds after Lua’s first shot had struck him. Officer Nakayama’s first shot appears to have struck the ground—not surprising since he had just taken a hit to his primary shoulder. Even though it was on the vest, the hit likely disrupted his draw to a degree. Nakayama point shoots a second shot with two hands 0.38 seconds later which likely struck Lua in the shin because Lua begins to fall.

Within 1.70 seconds of initiating the gunfight, Lua had shot at and hit two police officers with the first four rounds he fired. The entire gunfight lasted 2.62 seconds. (see note #3)

Perception and Reaction -- Is There a Lesson Here?

Events happen very fast in deadly force encounters. Quickly recognizing what is happening and then rapidly executing a pre-programed response is the key to prevailing in a deadly force encounter.

The person who takes the initiative gets to start the fight—all they require is decisiveness. Lua initiated the gunfight which gave him a significant time-advantage over the police officers.

Although Officer Garcia had drawn his pistol, he had no indication that Lua was going to use unlawful deadly force until an instant before Lua shot him. It is unlikely that Officer Garcia could have successfully engaged Lua before he was hit.

Lua’s first shot transition to Officer Nakayama was likely much faster than Officer Nakayama could have drawn his pistol from a retention holster. Nakayama was in the process of drawing his pistol when Lua’s shot struck him.

If we look at this incident using Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) decision cycle from the officer’s and the Lua’s perspective, Lua has already passed through a full OODA cycle. He Observed the officers approaching, Oriented when they parked the car, Decided to engage them, and began Acting while the officers were still in the Observe stage.

The quicker the defender (in this case the officers) perceives what is happening (observe), the quicker the defender can act (i.e. execute a response) (see notes #3 and #4).

The defender is typically behind in the decision cycle because the violent criminal actor is usually in the act stage while the defender is still observing. This is true of police and the private citizen.

Mental awareness and mindset is a critical component to surviving any defensive encounter involving deadly force. However, mindset alone is insufficient. It must be coupled with awareness, proper training, and a willingness to act. The solution to this challenge is to develop mental models of if “X” observation, then “Y” reaction. This allows one to skip the intervening steps in the OODA cycle.

In this example, Chicago Police policy (G03-02-05) permits the use of OC spray against “active resisters.” I am not going to second guess these officers and I recognize the difficulties all officers face in today’s politically charged environment. However, Lua was clearly an active resister and the immediate use of oleoresin capsicum spray may have precluded his ability to effectively engage the officers with deadly force.

The same holds true for the private citizen. If an unknown contact is approaching and attempting to engage you, there are several immediate actions you can take depending upon the totality of the circumstances. The key is to have a set of pre-planned actions to execute in response to a given stimulus.

For example, if I am pulling into my driveway and a car stops at the driveway entrance with young men exiting, I have several options. If I am still in the car, I can simply drive away. If I have exited the car, I can take cover and covertly draw my pistol and challenge them. Going through “what if” scenarios based upon your daily activities and deciding what your action would be in each scenario will significantly speed up your reaction if you are suddenly facing unlawful deadly force.

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Notes:

(1) ShotSpotter uses a series of microphones and sensors to detect and geolocate gunfire. 

(2) I base my time analysis on the FPS or frames per second of the videos the Chicago PD released which provides data to the 100ths of a second accuracy assuming the frame rates have not been altered.

(3) "Understanding that the simple elements of an officer’s response such as perceiving, deciding, and reacting take time, and understanding how much time is critical in assessing train-ing tactics and in investigating the dynamics of officer-involved use-of-force scenarios." Police Officer Reaction Time to Start and Stop Shooting: The Influence of Decision-Making and Pattern Recognition, William J. Lewinski, PhD; et al.; Law Enforcement Executive Forum, Vol. 14, No. 2 • June 2014

 (4) For an in-depth discussion of Boy’s concepts: https://www.artofmanliness.com/character/behavior/ooda-loop/